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ON THE COMMENTS
By

T

ARTHUR SELWYN MILLER

I.

HE Editors have sent me the commentaries of Professors Bowers,
Gilmore, and Baram on my paper. I wish to respond.* I do not wish
to alter my paper in any way. Nothing said by those gentlemen leads
me to believe that my perception of the nature of the problem confronting man and my proposal for law schools to become centers for
policy analysis are invalid.
In what follows I must again speak in short, declarative sentences
of a dogmatic nature, simply because time and space do not permit me
to do the job I would like. I shall not try to engage in a mutual
exchange of dogma, but will endeavor to point out where the three
commentators are in error. Nor will I engage in the puerile ad hominem
verbalizations of Professor Bowers, for that surely would not advance
the dialogue. However, I will mildly suggest that my paper must have
indeed touched a raw nerve for him to have had such a violent
reaction.
First, Professor Bowers: It will serve no useful purpose to refute
what he says on a point-by-point basis. That can be done quite easily.
Rather, I will content myself with attempting to point out how his
ideas are not in accord with some fairly well-known observers.
(1) The idea that universities must remain centers of objective
analysis runs squarely against the teaching of such people as Bridgman,
Polanyi, and Myrdal, not to mention Fulbright and Ridgeway. It
appears as though Bowers has not taken cognizance, or does not know,
what those writers (among many others) have to say. We must, in
other words, carefully examine just what objectivity means (and where
it is possible). If the commentary of Bowers is an example of scientific
objectivity, I fear that we are indeed in trouble. I happen to believe,
with Myrdal, that an indispensable requisite of all scholarships is to
"face one's valuations"; universities, and individuals within them, have
not done this, but the need grows more obvious as time goes by.
(2) Bowers obviously did not read my paper carefully, for
nowhere in it did I advocate that universities become political arenas
or soapboxes, "where any kind of rhetoric goes." I did suggest the
need for facing valuations (per Myrdal) and also for striving for a
right to a decent environment, which as Little Abner would say, "any
fool can plainly see" is something other than what he attributes to me.
* Professor Miller was unable to attend the conference, and his paper was presented by

Professor Ernest M. Jones of the University of Florida College of Law.
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(3) He manfully confesses ignorance about what I am talking
about, although that is quite apparent from the tenor of his remarks.
But when he questions whether I know what I am talking about, he
is making a statement that is unworthy of a professor at Cornell.
I think that if he would give a little thought to what I said in my paper,
he might then readily perceive that the statement he quotes has been
proffered by so many people that it has become almost commonplace.
(4) If Bowers wishes to disagree with Robert Gomer and John
Platt and Alvin Toffler and Don Price and Ralph Lapp, among many
others, by asserting that, "It isn't true that technology is producing
changes so awesomely rapid," he of course has a full first amendment
right to do so. The first amendment merely protects freedom of
expression; it contains no requirement that the statement be valid.
So if Bowers wants to ally himself against many others, scientists and
otherwise, of course he may. But he should realize also that he is likely
dead wrong.
(5) The same may be said for his notion that "it is not true that
society has never faced problems of that magnitude before." But he
fails, utterly, to give any historical examples. The Industrial Revolution
is merely the beginning of the modern scientific-technological revolution. He should have gone back even further than the nineteenth
century, for our perspective must encompass the entire range of history
(Just how barbed wire is relevant escapes me.).
(6) Whether the problems of poverty, population, and pollution
can be corrected, "given time," as Bowers says, is something we can
all fervently hope for. Surely even a professor of physics can see that
I would not suggest formation of centers for policy analysis if I did
not believe that such problems possibly are correctable. But I would
like to see some hard evidence, particularly on the question of population. His is a touching, even pious, faith; a faith that we can all hope
will come into fruition.
(7) He says that he is impatient to get to the question of moving
universities to deal realistically with social problems. But, if so, why
doesn't he suggest something?
(8) The Morrill Act is not probative evidence to negate the idea
that universities have policies of drift. It is a statute, Professor Bowers,
passed by Congress. What I was talking about (I could mention Lttle
Abner here again) is the internal governance of universities. Black
studies, it is true, were more reactions to perceived crises than just a
matter of drift. But that, unhappily, is what Charles Schultz once
called ad-hocery, certainly not in accordance with a carefully thought
out plan for the mission of the university. Bowers' dogmas are interesting, but he needs to furnish a few bits of hard evidence.
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(9) If there is no reason why universities cannot be modified,
then why doesn't Bowers suggest ways such modifications can be
effected, as well as their details? Strange.
(10) His opposition to my views on tenure are so delphic that
I cannot respond. What are those "profound" reasons that make
tenure so important? To say that industry and government also have
"time-servers" is not relevant to the issue. The essential question is
whether the university is doing its job adequately (whatever its mission
may be, and on that score surely there must be much hard thought),
and whether the tenure system is helping further the proper mission
of the university. What I call for is reexamination of that system under
due process safeguards. As the situation is now, it is more difficult to
get rid of an inadequate professor than it is to impeach a federal judge.
Just what values are served by protecting the lazy and the incompetent ?
In such a reexamination, there must of course be a delineation of
the mission of the university. In this country we have moved into a
situation of mass higher education; one in which a college degree is
necessary but is becoming meaningless. When everyone has one, it
loses its value. I do not advocate returning to the 19th-century concept
of the university for the aristocracy alone. But our universities are being
governed under principles and concepts derived from that time, while
presently both society at large and its institutions, including the universities, have changed fundamentally. (The study about to be published
on the role of the university in public affairs, funded by the Carnegie
Corporation for the presidents of the land grant colleges, may help in
setting new priorities.) Although he does not expressly say so, Bowers
apparently feels that "whatever is, is right" in the universities, or, if
not entirely right, is correctable. But how? In what direction? By what
means? Under what criteria? It is mysterious that Bowers does not
enlighten us on that score.
(11) Different perceptions of the order of magnitude of the
present crisis do not make anyone "a fool" who happens to disagree
with Bowers. Quite the contrary. If he thinks the thirties in general,
and Europe in the thirties and forties specifically, presented more
fundamental problems, he of course is at liberty to so believe and to
state his opinion. But it is not worthy of a professor of physics at Cornell
to label one who disagrees "a fool." That is not argument that anyone would use outside the gutter. Bowers does not define the problem
and castigates his friend, John Platt, for using the term "the crisis of
crises." We in the law schools tend by and large to make our dialogue
at least outwardly more courteous. Without being vacillating, we at
least can speak to each other in measured terms. Apparently this is
becoming increasingly difficult for the hard scientists, for as I write
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this the newspapers are carrying accounts of violence and name-calling
at the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science - and even, God save the mark! - of the sorry spectacle of one speaker at the AAAS convention bringing bodyguards with
him, apparently to prevent physical attack. (That is physicist Edward
Teller.) Where, pray, is that objectivity that Bowers says universities
display and implies that scientists have? Is there something about
physicists that . . . ?
(12) I find the remainder of his remarks temperate and reasonable, save for one or two instances. The paucity of experience in problem
solving by universities is clearly shown by his remarks. It is thin indeed,
as Bowers admits. He further admits that he does not know how to, or
whether we can, apply the probleim solving techniques in food supply,
such as Cornell does, to other areas "of more pressing social significance." For that matter, he does not even tell us what a problem is, and
that itself is a most difficult question, as I said in my paper. For
example, there is no hard evidence today that the 'green revolution"
in food production will solve the pressing needs of the hundreds of
millions of people in the world who are hungry. In simplest terms,
of course we can solve low-order technological "problems"; but how
do we translate that expertise into dealing with the social cancers of
poverty and peace, of population and pollution? Alvin Weinberg of the
Oak Ridge National Laboratory, which Bowers mentions, admits that
"technological fixes" will not get the job done alone, although they
can be of great help. Agreed. But please, Professor Bowers, let us have
some suggestions.
(13) In sum then, Professor Bowers appears to be violently opposed to my perception of the nature of the problem but - I hope I am
not misreading him - tends to agree in large part with the need for
the university, if not the law school, to become a center for policy
analysis. On the details of the latter point, there is room for reasonable
argument and compromise. The need is for the establishment of such
centers. I suggested the focus of the law school, not for mere reasons
of parochial guildism, but because at some time, in some way, law
must be used instrumentally as a means of bringing desired changes
into being. Lawyers, inept as they are, still are about the best problem
solvers, in a social sense, that America has. But that, as I say, is arguable, and I quite agree with Bowers that the need is to move the
dialogue along and to get some programs under way.
As for his emotional reaction, principally to my use of Platt and
others, the less said the better. I find it faintly amusing. Not amusing
at all are the tactics of the gutter, in descending to asinine namecalling. But that is his hang-up, not mine.
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Next, Professor Gilmore: Inasmuch as Gilmore says he agrees with
Bowers, what is said above must perforce apply to him. As for the
remainder of his remarks, I am willing to accept his characterization
of it as being "rambling." So it is. But he does raise some interesting
questions; one, that must be analyzed, is about centers for policy analysis.
He gives some basis for further discussion.
One thing is puzzling: He tends to equate policy analysis with
systems analysis. Perhaps this is understandable, for he is an economist
with obvious familiarity with some of the benefits and pitfalls of
systems analysis. Quite obviously, the two terms are not synonymous.
He should know better.
Finally, Professor Baram: His comments are mercifully brief, temperate, and to the point. I think that there is plenty of room for honest
disagreement about such matters as the need for more centers of policy
analysis.
Again, however, I am puzzled by his view that the District of
Columbia provides an excellent milieu for such a center, but that
Boston or Denver do not. Since Baram is closely involved in a multidisciplinary, multiuniversity teaching program in the Boston area - one
that looked in the summer of 1970 to health care for that area - I am
unable to grasp why Boston or Denver or Grand Forks, North Dakota,
or any other place, cannot be such a center, or at least begin to move
in that direction. After all, this is a time when cries for "participatory
democracy" are heard through the land, when there is growing distrust
and even fear of the federal government, and when the inadequacies
of state and local governments are becoming ever more obvious. In
this connction, I see no reason why what Baram calls "interdisciplinary
or clinical programs" cannot be established for teaching purposes.
If they are, then the result, as he says, will be policy analysis.
II.
These comments have been written under pressure of time. I have
not sought to document every statement in detail; nor did I in my
principal paper. There I presented a position, a point of view. Extensive
documentation or footnoting would have been superfluous, even though
they might have lent an aura of "scholarship" (pseudo-scholarship is
a better term) to the paper. If anyone, including Bowers and Gilmore,
thinks that these problems are easy of solution or that there is one
solution, he should read Ernest Nagel's fine book, The Structure of
Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation (1961). There
are more ways to truth (however that slippery concept might be
defined) than the scientific method, whatever it is, and it is high time
that the scientists, natural and social and behavioral, awakened to that
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Since writing the foregoing I have come across a statement on the
nature of the situation facing modern America (Davie, Futurology, The
London Observer, Jan. 3, 1971, p. 25):
[M]y next call ... was at the celebrated Stanford Research Institute, where I saw a high-powered electrical engineer named Norman
McEachron (I knew he was high-powered when he told me he had
been to Cambridge, as a Churchill Fellow, and had found the electrical
engineering "about 30 years" behind the times). McEachron, who had
a trim beard and a high quiff of hair, told me he worked partly as an
astrophysicist and partly as a futurist. He was trying, as part of a group,
to think about alternative futures for the U.S. The American government was financing the research.
McEachron explained that his own task was a small part of the
whole project, yet grand in scope, nevertheless. He was trying to answer
the question: what is the social situation in the U.S.? To this end he
had =rawn a number of graphs "measuring" the social scene, and they
were leading him to conclude that the U.S. was in a crisis "in the
medical sense: the patient may collapse."
"Since 1960," he said, "the curves on my graph are exponentially
different. By whichever measure I take, the trend is up: illegitimate
births, production and import of handguns, the rate of inflation, loss
of worktime through strikes, divorce, juvenile drug arrests, adult drug
arrests, assaults on policemen, incidence of adult and juvenile crime all of them." He showed me graphs; the line always rose, and in some
cases shot up alarmingly towards the top right-hand corner of the paper.
"Rates of pollution would probably show the same trend. Then
there's the economy; we're into a crisis that will be very hard to turn
around. No one knows what to do about it. And there's the ecological
crisis."
He expanded his theme of crisis, and then said that its central
fact was a conflict of values. "A society works when there is a correspondence between the values of its citizens, the social structure,
and the environment surrounding the society. But now they don't
correspond."
He talked of the clash of values between the young, the hardhats,
the blacks, and the Middle America whites. "We have a system whose
values developed in response to a given situation. Now we have
a changed situation, and the values are no longer appropriate. We
have to change. Mainstream culture simply doesn't have the answers
to our problems. In fact, the old value system actually increases the
problems- the notion that the pride of families and the power of
nations are to be furthered, as in the past, by population increase; the
notion that any technology that can be applied should be; a system of
economics based on an ever-increasing GNP and expenditure of irreplaceable resources; the belief that experts know best.
"And a shift in the values-system does seem to be emerging.
There's a really strong movement towards religion and drugs, though
the actual word religion is not often used. There is, for instance, a
move towards seeing life more as a Christian vocation than like a job;
that switch is really fundamental, more fundamental for the person
who makes it than getting rid of a wife. People seem to be striving for
a kind of revitalization of themselves and the culture, to try to find a
new basis for progress. One thing I've noted: it's amazing how often
Huey Newton, the Black Panther leader, cites the Constitution; it
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seems to stem from a feeling that the U.S. has betrayed its ideals. The
Declaration of Rights is a more revolutionary document than MARX."
Not all these ideas were new to me, but I had never heard them so
neatly fitted together. Before McEachron appeared, I had picked up
a house magazine advertising a show called "On A Clear Day You Can
See Forever." He seemed to be having a clear day.
"We simply have to change direction, but no one has any idea of
which direction to go in, therefore everyone has to be listened to.
What's most dangerous is the increasing tendency of different groups
not to listen to the others. They can't even agree to disagree. They
regard each other as inhuman. It's like primitive man who, as soon as
he hears a growl outside his cage, says 'Give me my club.' I end up
my work thinking: if we don't listen, we won't make it. The chances
of our survival may have passed: who can ever tell ?"
He showed me a chart his group had drawn up, showing "alternative futures" for the U.S. It was like a tree, with the present as the
roots and the possible futures as the tips of a dozen branches. Each
branch, when it reached the year 2000, had been given a label, ranging
from the desirable goal of "exuberant democracy" to increasingly
gloomy and appalling alternatives, ending up bleakly with "Caesarism"
and "collapse".
"The easiest paths to take," said McEachron, "all head into what
we've called a slough of despond: recession, confusion, apathy. It turns
out that, so far as we can see, it will be very hard to get to the desirable
future, what we've called exuberant democracy, and much easier to get
to an authoritarian form of state concentrating on social control, what
we've called 'Caesarism'."
Driving back down the freeway from Palo Alto to San Francisco,
among the solid shoals of cars and the neon signs; I reflected on the
report that McEachron and his colleagues had sent to Washington,
under contract no. OEC-i-7-7-071013-4274. The report said bluntly
that desirable future histories were scarce and that it was "paramount"
for the developed world to change its values - not that the Washington of Nixon and Agnew was likely to pay any attention.

Nota bene: I emphasize that quoting McEachron does not "prove"

the proposition, but it does indicate that those who toil in Ithaca, New
York, might well be advised to become au courant with what such
people are saying. To ridicule them, to shrug them off, is to emulate the
classic ostrich. Bowers, of course, is free to do so; but does it help?

